Connecticut College

Digital Commons @ Connecticut College
Connecticut College Books

Linda Lear Center for Special Collections &
Archives

1946

Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lectures, Volume 1
Henry Wells Lawrence
Charles Seymour

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.conncoll.edu/ccbooks
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Linda Lear Center for Special Collections & Archives at
Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Connecticut College Books by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Connecticut College. For more information, please contact
bpancier@conncoll.edu.
The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author.

,----------------------

t
I

�

HENRY WELLS LAWRENCE
MEMORIAL LECTURES

Volume I

CONNECTICUT COLLEGE, NEW LONDON

FOREWORD
With this publication the Henry Wells Lawrence Me
m01'ial Committee sees the fulfillment of its 01'iginal hopes,
for herein are included some of the representative writing of
Dr. Lawrence, and the first Lawrence Memorial Lecture,
delivered at the CoJJege, by President Charles Seymour of
Yale .University on February 27, 1945, with the introductory
remarks made upon that occasion by Dr. Frank E. M01'ris.
MARJORIE DILLEY, Chairman
MARY BULKLEY
KATHARINE LUDINGTON
E. ALVBRNA BURDICK
MARY C. Mc.KEE
FRANKE.MORRIS
loUISB POITER.

HANNAH G. ROACH
BESSIE B. WESSEL
ROSAMOND BEEBE CocliRAN '26
KATHRYN Moss '24
BARBARA STOTT TOLMAN '3S

February 1, 1946

HENR

Henry We
ll

New Yoc

k,

Y WELLS LAWRENC

s

Lawrence w as

the son o

f

bo
rn

He nry

We

Lilli an

G.

lls

an

E

,

18
7

9,
2, 1 8 7

December
d

-9 1 9 4
2

Nancy

Layme
n
ains,
Pl

in Nyack,

Law ceocc .
ew
oc .
k
N
Y
He received three de grees from
Yale U n ive
ty:
B
06
9
.
.
rsi
the
in 1 ,
A
in 190 ,7 and the Ph .D. n 191 . I
909 h sru
the M .A.
i
n
1
e
died
0
at che
1920 he ta
Universi ty o f Par . Fro
m 1910 to
e
is
ught h
o ry at
ist
University of Vermon t,
at D
artmo uth a n d
Middlebury
Uegcs
th
at
Co
.
d Gov
He was appointed Professor f Hit
rnmen
s o ty an
o
e
t ar
ca1cuc
Con n
College in 1920, and served as
Chair
artm
rom
man o f the
Dep
en t f
1921 to 1942. Durin g the summe r se ssio ns o f 1 9 2 •
wt
1 9 4 1, h t
e gh
7
ar Hampto n Inscirute.
He attended elementa

In

and hi gh sch oo

1914 he married

Massachuscrcs .
CoUege

ry

Their

childre n

'38; Major Henry

States Arm

y Air

We

Forces; and

are

lls

Li nco

l

South e

B ar bar
a

rbu

rg

at

Nor

folk

Downs

,

G.
:Lawren
ce, Co
nnca:i cuc
Yal
' 4 0 , o f th e U ni
ted
e
Billin
:La
wrence.
gs

La wren
ln

Wh te
i

in

ce,

CONTENTS
Anicles by Dr. Lawrence:
I.

Washington, Capitalism, and Nationalism

II. Our Next President's Job is Like Lincoln's
III. Declaration of Interdependence
IV. Excerpts from an Unfinished Paper for a Memorial Day
Address, 1941
First Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial Lecture, Dr. Seymour

I. WASHINGTON, CAPITALISM, AND NATIONALISM*
George Washington died in the year 1799, more than one hundred
and thirty-two years ago. At the time ?f his dea_th his fame was alr� ady
widespread and secure and the intenrunable series of laudatocy oraoons
which he so well de�erved began at once. During the intervening
century and more tireless orators have struggled, with increasing diffi
culty, to pay adequate tributes of eloquenc<; to this grea � man. (?ne
difficulty, which has grown with the years, 1s th�t of saying anyth�ng
which has not already been said several hundred tunes before. Happily,
however, so far as Washington's birthday speakers are concer �ed,
patriotic American audiences desire no�ing so �uch on these �cas1�ns
as the robust repetition of the resounding p �atttudes of adulaoon :,vtth
which they have long been thoroughly farruliar. Indeed they are likely
to resent as inappro priate and out of order the introduction of any
other than the usual facts and points of view about our forcmosc
national hero.
However childish may be this taste for a reiteration of the ob
vious, it is not peculiar to America. It is charaaeristic of most nations
to exalt, even to deify, their most popular heroes, and to wish said
concerning them only words of praise, fti for the commemoration of
demigods. Such words nourish a vigorous national pride, and they
are supposed also to fire the hearts of impressionable youth with a
reverent determination to follow worthily in the footsteps of the great
departed. Whether it be the children of the obscure little state of
Albania, thrilled with worshipful admiration for their warrior hero,
Georges Scanderbeg; or the soldiers of militant Japan, pausing in
their ruthless warfare about Shanghai to adore the spirit of an ancient
emperor; or the patriotic citizens of the United States, mobilized for
a bicentennial veneration of the immortal George Washington; it is
clear enough that hero worship is common to chem all, and that this
is a potent force in the life of every nation. That this force can be of
incafculable worth to any people is widely recognized. That it may
also do them incalculable harm seems to be less generally undersrood
and to stand in need of some emphasis at this moment.
. In our o_wn United Stat�, for instance, it may seem almosc sacri•
legious _co point out that the mBuence of George Washington may be
productive of harm as well as of good. In his case, as in those of many
o�er national heroes, it is entirely possible so to misuse his fame and
mtsa�pl� �e lessons from his life as to produce results which he him
self, 1� livmg _ now, would be the foremost in deploring. For example,
�ashmgton �s commonly _ regarded as a steadfast supporter of polit·
teal conservausm. The weight of his great name is often thrown into
�e scales _of_ controversy against proposals for any radical modifica
tton of extStmg governmental institutions. Probably a great majority
•This articl� was published in_ The American Scholar, Volume I, No. ;, May,
19;2, and 1s rcpnntcd here with the permission of the publisher.
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of the citizens of the United States today would deny with indignant
amazement the assertion that the career of George Washington re
sembles in several fundamental respects those of such modern radicals
as the Indian Nationalist Gandhi and the Russian Bolshevik Lenin.
Yet these three world figu res have at least chis much in common:
each of them defied the lawfully constituted authority which ruled
his native land and, at the imminent risk of war and bloodshed, sought
to overthrow the established political system and to replace it by one
which most intelligent persons throughout the world condemned as,
at best, a rash experiment, offering slight hopes of success and great
probability of disaster. In winning independence for the new American
republic, Washington was anything but a conservative; he was, of
course, a revolutionary, quite as truly as Lenin and Gandhi were revo
lutionaries. He was, however, a revolutionary of the eighteenth century,
and therefore his ideas differ greatly from those of the revolutionaries
of the twentieth century. It is this difference which deceives many
into believing that he was a conservative. It is a misuse of his fame
and a misapplication of the lesson of his life, to count him steadily
on the conservative side of current political controversies.
One of the easiest and most common perversions of the Washing
ton influence is that based on bis oft-quoted advice to eighteenth cen
tury America to steer dear of foreign entanglements and seek safety
in a policy of diplomatic isolation. How often and how solemnly are
his warning words quoted, and in how many different ways is the
weight of his influence brought to bear against any steps toward in
ternational cooperation on the pare of twentieth century United States!
Yet Washington was giving advice concerning world conditions of the
eighteenth century, with which he was competently familiar, and not
concerning the unforeseeable conditions of the twentieth century. There
is no reason to believe that he wished to fix the foreign policy of
his country for all future time, nor that he would have given similar
advice amid the conditions of today. Indeed, if we may imagine the
disembodied spirit of our great first president still watchful- and solicit
ous for the welfare of the republic he founded, it is easy to believe
him sorrowful for the stupidity, or indignant at the insincerity, which
prompts so many of his countrymen today co follow blindly the advice
which was so helpful in 1797 and is so harmful in 1932. "It would
be ironic," says a recent editorial in a powerful newspaper, "if, in
the year in which all America is paying homage to its greatest citizen,
the advice of Washington on the conduet of our foreign relations
should be flouted." To which it may be fairly replied, "How in.finitely
more ironic it would be co follow the advice which, so far as our
present circumstances are concerned, Washington never intended to
give."
For, after all, Washington was not essentially an isolationist. He
was, rather, a cooperacionist when there was opportunity for coopera
tion on anything like a basis of equality. The historical evidence for
5

this is abundant and striking. There were plenty of isolationists in
Washington's day, but he was not one o_f them. Oth �rs feared to encer
into a league of sovereign states and nsk the curca1lmenc o�.sepa�te
independence, but he actively supported such courageous cooperattoo.
For instance, when Washington and other supf>?rters of a league were_
proposing to bring order out _ of chaos �y adoptmg the present Co�!
tution of the United Scates, 1c was Pamck Henry, famed and pamoac
son of Virginia, who roared in � lis!113Y that, "This government subjeas
everything to the Northern maiomy. :"e thus put u� bounded _ power
over our property into hand� not having a common mterest with us.
Sir, this is a picrure so homd, so wretched, so dreadful, �at I need
no longer dwell upon it." Against thi� nightmare of Pacnck He�,
it was Washington who directed soothmg words and calm reasonmg
in the following persuasive letter, seeking to enlist Henry's support
of the new League and Consritucion.
"Your own judgment will at once discover," Washington wrote,
"the good and the exceptionable parts of it; and your experience of
the difficulties which have ever arisen when attempts have been made
to reconcile such a variety of interests and local prejudices as pervade
the several States, will render explanation unnecessary. I wish the
Constitution which is offered, had been more perfect; but I sincerely
believe it is the best that could be obtained at this time .... From a
variety of concurring accounts it appears co me that the political con
cerns of this country are in a manner suspended by a thread, and that
the Convention has been looked up co by the refleetiog part of the
community with a solicitude which is hardly co be conceived; and, if
nothing bad been agreed upon by that body, anarchy would have
ensued, the seeds being deeply sown in every soil."
Here we see the cooperationist Washington energerically at work.
When the time was ripe for his beloved homeland, the sovereign State
of Virginia, to enter upon entangling alliances with the foreign states
of Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the other ten, he boldly led her
isolation and into that close cooperation
fo�ard out of a traditional
_
which had become essennal to the welfare and security of all. To be
sure Washington did, in the eighteenth century, advise that the infant
United States of America avoid active participation in the quarrels
of the �dult and relatively gigantic nauoos of Europe. To assume
from this, however, that he would advise a similar isolation for the
adult and gigantic United States of the twentieth century is co dis
re �rd �ltoge �er the_ es �a�lished faa of his cooperative and progressive
acaon m leadmg V1rg101a to enter the League of American Nations
under the Covenant of 1787.
. A�other.common misuse of the influence of Washington consists
10 quoung his words when they happen to reinforce the views of the
quoter, but denying equal publicity to those words of his which an
cagoni�e such views. Thus, his warning against foreign entangle
ments 1s so often quoted as co be familiar to all, but his equally vigor6

ous aversion co the rise of political parties is much less widely known.
Many who urge us to follow his advice on foreign policy as peren
nially applicable and an evidence of Washington's almost superhuman
prescience would, in all candor, be forced co admit that his warn
ings against political parties were almost absurd. However bad these
parties may sometimes become, the almost universal experience of
mankind has shown that they are as indispensable to popular govern
ment as the weather is co agriculture. Washington's failure to grasp
this fact shows that his political intelligence had the usual human
limitations, and that his advice on public affairs should be, like that
of other statesmen, subjected to critical examination.
Toward the major governmental problems of his time, neverthe
less, Washington usually showed a competent liberalism, an attitude
of hospitality coward changes, even fundamental ones, if they gave
promise of general betterment. largely the economic and political
world he lived in was patterned after the systems of an earlier period:
systems which were on the eve of fundamental modification or re
placement. The economic system of his age and region was localism,
the production of commodities by household industry, for sale in a
nearby market; yet signs were multiplying that this system was soop
to change and that commodities would more and more be produced
by machinery and factory labor for sale in markets increasingly wide
spread and remote. The political system of his day was imperialism,
the ruling of colonies by a mother country for the interest and wel:.
fare primarily of that mother country; yet many signs were evident
which foretold a changed future in which colonies would assert their
right and determination to be ruled primarily each for its own wel
fare. So far from being hostile to these signs of change and readjust
ment, Washington showed an open-minded hospitaliry toward them.
The progress of industrial and commercial capitalism he facilitated
by friendly tariff and financial measures. The exchange of colonial
for national status he promoted with unflagging zeal, even at the
price of armed violence and rebellion. His face was sceadfascly set
toward a better economic and political future, and he dared to experi
ment with new and uncertain systems, namely, industrial capitalism
and republican nationalism, when the old systems seemed no longer
adequate co meet the needs and desires of a changing world.
It is this quality of open-minded hospitality toward economic and
political experimentation that gives to the example of Washington
an immediate significance in the year 1932. By this example we are
urged, not necessarily to support the systems which he supported, but
rather to maintain an open-minded hospitality toward experiments
for their betterment. By way of- illustration, in the foliowing brief
survey and criticism of the systems which dominate us today, an at
tempt is made co view our world of the twentieth century in some
what the same spirit as that in which Washington seems co have viewed
his world of the eighteenth.
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Largely the economic and p olitical wor�d o� 1932 is patterned
after cwo great systems: capirahsm and nauonahsm. These systems
have been tested by many generation�. They proved measurably �de
quace for meeting the needs of the nineteenth century. The twenc1 :th
century, however, has subjected them co such unprecedented strains
and stresses that their continuing adequacy is gravely doubted by many
thoughtful persons. Their outright destruction would imply upheaval
and catastrophe; their deftation and adaptation, however, need produce
no such calamitous consequences.

The rational deflation of capitalism would leave almost unim
paired the great driving po_ wer of the . urge . to acqu_ isitivencss, th �u�
it would transfer some of its present 10ordmate gams from the md1vidual to the community. Capi_talism has _ lo�g. disrlayed two con
spicuous merits: a powerful sumulus co md1v1dua effort, and an
enormous productivity. Alongside these, however, there have been
two equally conspicuous faults: insecuriry, taking the form of re
oment depressions within nations, and of tariff competitions and
imperialistic wars among nations; and faulry distribution, in which
selfish shrewdness rather than public service normally won dispro
portionately large rewards. The problem is, of course, to preserve
these merits and to eliminate the faults; to reduce somewhat the
competitive element and to enlarge the cooperative; to secure in the
interest of the general welfare a better coordination of effort and re
ward, a more reliable continuity of employment, using coward these
ends the unavoidable minimum of collective coercion, and preserving
the maximum of individual initiative consistent with social health.
The technical task of making necessary readjustments is obviously so
complex and wide-reaching as co challenge, perhaps co dismay, the
most competent. Certainly nothing more can be attempted here than
an extremely general indication of the direction in which progress in
this matter may be sought. To give at least a suggestion of something
concrete and specific amid all this vagueness I shall hazard three bits
of advic� for the or�inary ciciz�n: fust, stop bellowing at Bolshevism
an� begm to study 1t; second, mstead of merely fearing Fascism, ex
amme c�reful!y 1C:5 . adva�ta �e� and limitations; third, judge our
democrat1c-nauonalisuc-cap1talist1c system by its apparent adaptability
to the needs of today and tomorrow rather than by its past achieve
ments.

The deflation of nationalism, long overdue seems more nearly
possible and more urgently necessary today than' heretofore and the
time_ is _ripe _ co urge it franklf. The large share of an ex'aggerated
�anonalism 1? the present stalling of the world's economic machinery
is no � so evident that the sufferers, however jingoistic they may have
been 10 the past, are at last somewhat disposed to listen to faas and
reason: A few tim�ly �acts on which to base a more nearly sane
.
reasoruog about aanoaalism are the following:
8

The rampant nationalisms of 1914 caused the World War, one of
whose malefaccions is thac colossal derangement of trade and finance
which so greatly helped to produce the present world depression.
The haughty and alarmed nationalisms of the viaors in char War,
and the resentful nationalisms of the vanquished, effeccively bar the
establishment of any jusc and orderly security on which to rebuild
the welfare of humanity.
National greed for exclusive economic advantage bas cluttered up
the world with tariff walls, thus denying major commercial benefits
to all in order to secure minor gains for a few.
The dogma, so widely and devoutly believed in today, that no
nation can honorably tolerate limitations on its sovereignty, is a pe
culiarly malignant and provocative survival of ancient tribalism, offer
ing only disaster co the closely knit civilization of our times.
The boasdul assumption of unique excellence and unquestionable
righteousness for one's own nation, as commonly fostered by the
schools, the press, and the politicians of nearly all countries, makes
peace precarious and war perennially imminent.
Ac critical moments the wisdom of international statesmanship is
futile and powerless in face of the fervor and the fury of narrowly
nationalistic patriotisms. According to the current phrase, "no gov
ernment could survive" in Poland or Germany, for instance, which
took a rational position toward the problem of the Polish Corridor
and Danzig, or in Japan and China which viewed the vexatious
Manchurian and Shanghai tangles in a judicial rather than a jingoistic
manner. With a perfervid nationalism thus passing beyond rational
guidance in any grave international emergency almost anywhere in
the world, the safety, or even the survival, of our civilization is
doubtful.
In the presence of these facts, thoughtful and courageous persons
in every nation should lead a direct attack on that inflated nationalism
which the twentieth century bas inherited and cherished as one of
its most precious prejudices. A deflated nationalism would not, of
course, solve all our international problems immediately, but it seems
to be an indispensable preliminary to their solution.
It is, I believe, no fantastic presumption to claim that the influence
of Washington's example is in accord with criticisms and proposals
such as those just given. His support of indusuial capitalism and
republican nationalism in the eighteenth century carries no assurance
that he would approve the continuance of these systems unchanged,
if they seemed no longer adequate amid twentieth century conditions.
What his example teaches is rather that a wise conservatism includes
a watchful readiness to modify, or even to replace, outmoded insti
tutions. It is highly desirable, moreover, that the mighty influence of
Washington be rescued from those who are crying to exploit it wholly
in the interest of reaction and a return co eighteenth century "nor
malcy." Patriotic celebrations in honor of national heroes, American
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and other too often take on the charaaer of exhortations either to
stand pat' where we now are, or else to go back to "the good old
days," even though these very heroes we �e lauding were aaive chiefly
in leading on to better days ahead. It is a perverse and dangerous
misuse of the memory of our pioneer statesmen to count chem as
upholders of the status quo .. Geor� e \Vashington led armed revolt
against the status quo, and hts leadmg was forward coward the new,
not backward toward the old. Now is the critical moment for em
phasizing this fact. While all America is celebr�ting c�e bicentennial
of his birth let us send the challenge far and wide agarnst those who
misuse his name and fame as a shelter for outworn institutions and
ideas. Surely Washington was of that number who courageously
turned their backs upon the false securities of the past and ventured
hopefully forth into the creative uncertainties of the future. The
forward-looking Americans of today have an indefeasible right to
claim him as their spiritual ancestor and co invoke his blessing on
their constructive efforts to rescue our common country and our com
mon world by moving courageously forward.

II. OUR NEXT PRESIDENT'S JOB IS LIKE LINCOLN'S*
Eighty years ago, in 1860, a presidential campaign was being
fought for the saving of democracy and the United Scates of .America.
It elected Abraham Lincoln. The story of how he then proceeded to
save his country and democracy, may throw a little light on the terrific
task ahead of Franklin Roosevelt or Wendell Willkie, in steering our
ship of state through the desperate storms of the war which burst
upon the world just a year ago.
In Lincoln's day the United States of America was the only large
scale experiment in government by the people under republican forms
anywhere in the world; a sort of oasis of democracy in a vast desert
of monarchies. Its downfall had long been predicted, and at length
seemed about to happen, over slavery and secession. If it accually did
happen, the cause of political democracy in the modern world was
probably lost, at lease for several generations.
In mt,ering this crisis, Lincoln not only resorted co war. He,
further, began the outright abolishment of an economic system that
might fairly � called 100 per cent American; a system chat had ante
dated . the nat:10� and �own up with it, contributing largely to its
matenal prosperity. This system was the well-established practice of
human slavery. Thu s_ in the 1860's democracy was preserved, though
an outworn econoIDJc 5rstem - that of plantation slave labor - was
overthrown and great v1?le'?-ce done co numerous property righcs long
guaranteed by the Consuruuon.
•This article is dated September, 194-0, and was sold to Every Wult Mag,ai,r,
Permission for reprinting has been given by NEA Service, Inc., Qevel and.
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Will Roosevelt, or the man elected to succeed him, find it neces
sary to resort to equally desperate expedients in rescuing American
democracy from its ferociously aggressive totalitarian foes and rivals?
Toward answering this urgent question, it may be helpful to jot
down a few points of comparison between democracy's predicament
in 1860 and in 1940.
In 1860 American democracy was still relatively youthful, experi
mental, and untested, eyed with distrust and dislike by the European
neighbors, who had long supported monarchy. Today it is our democ
racy which is mature - its enemies say decrepit - daring from before
1789, and its rivals which are youthful and full of pep and swagger,
fascist Italy dating back only to 1922, Nazi Germany to 1933, and
Bolshevik Russia to 1917; all more or less united by a common hatred
of democracy, and all on the prowl against their neighbors. The chief
prowler in Lincoln's time was France, under Emperor Napoleon III,
who was as eager to annex Latin America as Hider is now supposed
to be; both of them putting new life into our Monroe Doctrine.
Russia. was then friendly to the Union, that is the North, and to the
capitalist system, but not to democracy. Great Britain, more powerful
in the world then than she is at this moment, was favoring Southern
aristocracy rather than Northern democracy.
In general, however, p olitical and economic thinking seemed
steadier in Lincoln's world than in ours. The great explosion of 1789,
the French Revolution, was seventy years in the past, and the great
war against Napoleon I had �en pretty well liquidated since 1815.
Imperialism seemed secure; nationalism was rapidly winning its way;
and capitalism was hardly challenged. In contrast, our present ideology
is feverishly unsettled. The great war of 1914-1918, instead of being
liquidated, seems co have been only adjourned; and the great Russian
explosion of 1917 had not yet ceased to echo when we were startled
again by similar upheavals touched off by Mussolini and Hider. Im
perialism seems to be changing masters; nationalism is deforming itself
into a paganized and war-provoking religion; and capitalism begins to
look like a fat lamb among hungry wolves of totalitarianism.
Nevertheless, Lincoln's problem was in some respects tougher
than today's. It was closer at band; inside the country, instead of
across a couple of oceans. It was less postponable; before Lincoln
actually reached the White House, South Carolina and other states had
begun to break up the Union, and down in Alabama the sentiment
was emblazoned on a banner, "Resistance to Lincoln is Obedience to
God." The phrase "If Lincoln is elected" had long been used some
what as we say "If Hitler invades the Western Hemisphere."
Lincoln had plenty of advice as to what he should do to solve
this terrifying problem. The New York Herald, "the most powerful
organ in the country for the formation of public opinion," told him
Hady co turn the presidency over to somebody else. "A grand oppor
tunity now exists," said its editorial, "for Lincoln co avert impending
11

ruin and invest his name with an immortality far more enduring than
wouid attach to it by his elevation to the Presidency. His wi� dra� al
ac chis time from the scene of confticc, and the surcender of his claims
to some national man who would be acceptable to both sections, would
render him the peer of Washington in patriotism.. If he persists in his
present position, in the teeth of such results as �•s elecuon must pro
duce, he will cotter into a dishonored grave, driven there perhaps by
the hand of an assassin, leaving behind him a memory more execrable
than that of Arnold -more despised than that of the traitor Catiline."
Similar advice from southern newspapers was less politely phrased.
The Richmond Examiner, for instance, resented Virginia's necessity "to
bend her haughty neck beneath the paw of the Abolition orangoucang
that skulked co Washington the other day from the wilds of Illinois."
These gentle admonitions may remind some today of occasional remarks
about "chat man in the White House" and bis possible third term.
Then as now several ways of meeting the appalling problem were
open co the President. He might submit co aggression; but Lincoln
could hardly do that after condemning Buchanan's rumored surrender
of Fort Sumter with the angry outburst, "If that is true they ought co
hang him!" Nor does such submission fit very well with Roosevelt's
remarks about quarantining aggressors and stabbings in the back.
Indeed, his attitude seems co be more like chat of the fiery abolitionist
agitator, William Lloyd Garrison, who when rebuked with, "Mr.
Garrison, you are coo excited -you are on fire!" replied, "I have
need to be on lire, for I have icebergs around me to melt!" The "ice
bergs" today might be the so-called "isolacioniscs," who, right or wrong,
keep a good deal cooler amid all the fire and fury than the President
thinks they should be.
Debate still goes on about the wisdom of Lincoln in refusing the
middle way of meeting his problem, namely, compromise, instead of
war; and many are inclined to prefer Roosevelt's policy, up to dace,
of avoiding, or at least postponing, war while accively aiding what
seems co most of us the right side by technically neutral means. Such
would probably urge that Lincoln saved democracy the hard way,
just as the lives of many wounded Civil War soldiers were saved the hard
way, that is by amputation of their limbs, whereas today democracy may
�rhaps be saved more _skillfully, �ithout c�e costly amputations of life,
liberty, and the purswt of happmess which war necessarily involves.
�e�s woul ? point _out, however, the grave risks run by the war
avo1dmg policy, lest 1t enable the wrong side co triumph.
The question we started with still remains unanswered. If war
com�, or ev �n if it does not, will the President tod ay find it necessary,
as Lincoln did, to lop off some outworn economic institution in order
�o save democracy? . As we l?Ok back upon plantation slavery now, it
1s not hard co realize �at 1t needed to be lopped off. But it was
pr<?6ably as hard _co realize _that need, and possibility, in 1860, as it
1s 10 1940 to see JUSt what 1s wrong, and curable, in our present cco12

nomic system. Is there, perhaps, some truth in the ceaseless jibing at
us by our totalitarian rivals that our so-called democracy is really a
plutocracy? That it is best suited to the exploitation of the stupid
many by the smart few? That we are actually ruled by a little group
of multi-millionaires, through their control of press, radio, public opin
ion, jobs, the courts, and the police? That the blessings of democracy
come chiefly co a tiny fraction of the population, who allow co the
exploited masses only the crumbs of prosperity, and who have now
stalled their own economic machine by depriving these masses of ade
quate purchasing power?
Whoever will save democracy today muse do something about
questions like these, in addition to checking the depredations of such
obstreperous fellows as Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. Whoever can
solve all these tremendous problems, or even put them on the way
coward a rational solution, will deserve a place beside Lincoln in the
esteem of his fellow citizens, and share with him the splendid tide
of "savior of democracy."

III. DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE*
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for
the peoples to dissolve the political bounds which have separated them
from one another, and co unite the Powers of the earth in the coopera
tive and controlling organization to whose benefits the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect for the intelligence
of mankind requires that they declare the causes which impel them
co this cooperation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created
equal ; that they are endowed by their Cre;ltOr with certain unalienable
Rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi•
ness. That co secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;
that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safery and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will
dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for
light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown,
that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable,
than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are
accustomed. But when a long train of injustices and calamities, show
ing invariably the Government's inadequacy, evinces its helplessness
co save them from absolute Ruin, it is their right, it is their dury, to
•This article is undated. There is no evidence that it was published.
13

throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
security.
Such bas been the patient sufferance of the Nations of the world
today; and such is now the necessity whi:11 constrains them to alter their
former Systems of Government. The history of the � resent system � f
international relations is a history of repeated aggressions and calaau
ties, all having in natural sequence the establishment of a d7vastating
chaos among the nations. To prove this, lee Faces be submmed co a
candid world.
Toe present system of international relations has now arrived at
the following situation:
In Europe, war seems so close at hand that almost frantic efforts
are being made merely co postpone it.
In the Far East, Japan is relying on the imminence of a European
war as a safeguard against interference in her ruthless empire building.
All signs point to the early outbreak of a vast international
struggle, which few desire but nobody knows how to avert.
The collapse of several illusory supports of international peace,
such as the Versailles Treaty, has greatly alarmed the peoples of the
world. A terror of uncertainty envelops them like a noxious fog,
and they are ready to be led into desperate undertakings, seeking
escape from their hideous insecurity and suffering.
Half the world is bent on seizing the possessions of the ocher
half. Italy, Germany, and Japan are educating their youth into mad
dogs of patriotism. Grear Britain, France, and the United States are
preparing to defend, but never co share, their more or less ill-gotten
territories and advantages.
Millions in many countries are so near the starvation line, and
so far below the comfort line, chat che immediate prospect of jobs and
good wages, aeared even by war, entices them like a mirage in a
thirsty desert.
War, as the ultimate means for deciding the questions we really
care about, has never been honestly abandoned or adequately replaced.
le is the logical climax of chat ruthless and competitive smartness which
nations commonly practice toward each other in lieu of generosity or
even of fair dealing .
. In earlier stages of this calamitous situation, We, the peace
lovmg common people of the world, have Petitioned for Redress in
the most humble terms. Our repeated Petitions have been answered
onl y by repeate� evasions, postponements, and futilities. A system
whose character 1s thus marked by every aa which may reveal inade
quacy, is evidently unfit to guide the destiny of enlightened peoples.
Nor have we, in each nation, been wanting in our attentions to
our foreign brethren. We have joined them, from time to rime, in
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attempting legislation to promote a common jurisdiction over us all.
We have reminded each other of the circumstances of our common
humanity and interests. We have appealed to each other's native jus
tice and magnanimity, and we have conjured each other by the ties
of our common kindred, to disavow these narrow nationalisms, which
would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. Yet
our traditions and our rulers have been deaf to the voice of justice
and of consanguinity. We must therefore acquiesce in the necessity
to denounce these traditions and these rulers, and hold them as the
enemies of Mankind and of Peace.
We, therefore, the peace-loving common people of the world,
uniting in earnest consideration of our present emergencies, appealing
to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions,
in the Name and by the Authority of all free people everywhere,
solemnly publish and declare that these widely scattered peoples are,
and of right ought to be, closely united in cooperative and interde
pendent states; that they are absolved from all exclusive and unlimited
allegiance to the states of their present citizenship, and that all such
political connection between them and their several states is, and ought
to be, rotally dissolved, and that, as a dose union of cooperative and
interdependent states, they have full Power to outlaw War, guarantee
Peace, regulate Alliances, unfetter Commerce, and do all other necessary
Acts and Things which the several independent and competitive states
have shown themselves unable to do for the essential welfare of mankind.
And for the support of this Declaration, with a furn reliance on
the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other
our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.

IV. EXCERPTS FROM AN UNFINISHED PAPER FOR
MEMORIAL DAY, 1941*
Today the leading nations of the world are busy again,
preparing for the long continuance of Memorial Days ; and a vast
number of citizens of the United States are in a state of alarm and honest
bewilderment as to whether we too should now plunge into the slaugh
ter. Most of us may agree that the whole thing is a tragic and stupid
mess.....
We are all buried under an avalanche of urgent questions that
nobody can answer competently. Should we be isolationists? Should
we be interventionists? Or is there some, better, middle ground? Is
Hider, at the moment, invincible? Must he, nevertheless, be crushed?
*This paper contains parts of several speeches, letters to Editors, and other
prepared articles. It seems to be a summary of bis views prepared by Dr.
Lawrence in the spring of 1941, and is, therefore, of particular interest.
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Or is there some other way toward making the war less ruinous to us
and our hopes? ....If our earlier views about avoiding all war n�w
seem to us unrealistic and futile, does this show that we are berng
corrupted by propaganda, or rather that we are being enlightened by
events?
Neatly formulated answers to such questions do not en�. our
painful doubtings. On the contrary, they often arouse our susp1aons.
Who are the people who advise us to be isolationists?. lovers of
America, no doubt, and haters of war; but the same advice comes to
us from the lovers of Hider and from those who wish co keep America
defenseless. Who tell us to be interventionists? Those who seek to
end the existing international anarchy, and those who doubt that we
can long escape the anti-democratic domination of a victorious Hitler;
but we get very similar advice from our own munitioneers and our new
imperialists, charmed by the vision of an American super-empire dom
inant over all other empires.. .. .
More than we realize too, our thinking today is filled with fury
and shon-sightedness. This is panly because war is necessarily furious;
partly also because nobody possesses adequate fore-sightedness. Our
best hope, it seems co me lies in trying to be as reasonable and as
realistic as we can, and in trying to look ahead, beyond the ending
of the war. In doing this, no doubt we shall often be misunderstood
.... but this should neither surprise nor dismay us. We shall merely
be doing our bit, or at least trying to, toward rescuing the war from
complete futility. ....
I find that my own views have changed during the past year
about the pan that the United Scates should play in the present war.
It jolted me a little to read the other day the following paragraphs
which I had written and published in April of 1940: I quote:
"Two rational but sharply conflicting views as to what the
United States should do toward ending the present war, seem
to be gaining wide sup pcn. Stating them here might help to
clarify somebody's thinking. One view may be stated somewhat
as follows: 'Narrowly considered, our interests are with the
Allies, in that both they and we are the privileged possessors of
the best parts of the earth; we enjoy a common rulership by the
benevolent bourgeoisie; and we are comparatively loyal to the
stat11.r q110 in ec�nomi �, politics, _morality and religion. Therefore,
we should hearnly praise the Allies and as heanily damn Germany
till the necessity for defeating Dictatorship and Naziism shall seem
to most of us a sufficient reason for our entrance into the military
struggle.' The other view runs thus. 'More broadly considered,
the welfare of all peoples, including ourselves and the present
belligerents on both sides, would probably be best served by a
pea �e w!thout victory, . a Strategic retreat of the possessors, and a
paaficaoon of all parnes concerned, by exhaustion and federation.
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Therefore, we in the United States would better resist the rising
tide of propaganda for scapegoatism, and hold out for funda
mental reconcilements, economic, political, moral and religious.
Certainly not before such reconciiements are dearly attainable,
should we consider any military participation in the war.'"
It was the last sentence especially in this year-old opinion that jolted
me most: "no military participation in the war" by us till fundamental
reconcilements are "clearly attainable." I have come to doubt gravely the
possibility of "fund amental reconcilements" with a victorious Hitler,
and also to doubt the substantial checking of these victories until the
full strength of the United States is thrown into the war. If that full
strength can be acrually mobilized only by our declaring, and whole
heartedly entering, war, then, I think, we should no longer stop short
of war; and I mean "shooting war," and the sooner the better.
To such a stand as this, the isolationists and many of the unde
cided will immediately object that we would thus be sticking out our
neck in a matter that was fund amentally none of our business . . .
The Western Hemisphere is inevitably part of Hitler's business. Unless
he rules it, his basic principle of Nazi domination breaks down. The
Germans cannot really be supermen if half the world escapes them and
continues to defy them. Hitler's way of life contradicts ours so funda
mentally that reconcilement seems impossible.....
At about this point we would do well, I think, to consider a
myth that is gaining wide credence nowadays, a defeatist myth, care
fully nourished by the Nazis; the myth of Hitler's invincibility. Is
Hitler really invincible? The Nazi propagandists would like to have
us think so. He certainly did get the jump on his antagonists, and
he is still going strong. But history is crowded with conquerors that
were considered invincible for a long time. By superiority of one sort
or another they won brilliant victories, and, lo! they were labelled
"invincible." Gusty popular alarm created a myth about them, a de
featist myth, that resistance against them was futile . . . . History
strongly suggests that, soon or late, the myth of invincibility explodes
in the face of its promoters.
There is another myth that still awaits exploding; the myth that
international, military war is permanently inevitable; as permanently
inevitable as a lot of other pests of mankind were long supposed to
be, such as witchcraft, human slavery, and a long list of now curable
diseases and preventable plagues. Though the explosion of this war
myth is by no means "just around the corner," the present moment
seems to me very opportune for setting a bomb under it. The meta
phorical bomb that I have in mind for this useful task of destroying,
or at least damaging, the war myth, is the mobilizacio� and purposeful
direction of hate - H A. T E ! Hate directed, not agamst the boys on
the other side of No Man's Land, whom our boys are required to
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shoot; but against the real enemy, the '?': uses of war: poli_ti?1l causes,
economic causes, emotional causes, tradmonal causes, stupidity causes.
1f there is some truth in the view thac mankind is on the long way
up from ferocity to fraternity, we should noc fail co ucili_ze his present
oucburstS of ferocity in a tremendous effort co destroy its causes, the
basic causes of war.
In this present war we should make our bate more intelligent!
Wars cannot go on without hace. The trouble with most wars has been
that the bare was misdirected - was aimed at the wrong things .
Needed today is a hatred against the people and the things chat made
today's war inevitable. Till Hider and his supporters are stopped,
doubtless our fury must be directed chiefly at the Germans; but Jong
before they are crushed into helplessness, it will be time to channel our
hare against those causes of war also that happen co come from our
side. . . . . The permanent enemy of us all is not frenzied Germany
so much as it is the greedy or careless willingness of many of us every
where to make gain out of exploitation, cruelty, and injustice practiced
against human beings who happen to be outside our national, racial,
or religious group, or our economic class. Now, when we are so deeply
stirred by war, right now, is the moment to direct our war hatreds
against war itself, and against the narrow nationalisms, the covetous
imperialisms, the bigoted racialisms, and the ruthless business compe
titions, which inevitably invite war all the time. In our present angry
mood, we are ripe for demanding of all governments, including our
own, any necessary changes and sacrifices coward ending anarchy among
nations and poverty within them. This is not a demand for any sudden
change in human nature. It is a demand, rather, for certain organiza
tions and restraints which human nature so obviously needs, and which
angcy common sense among the democracies may now at last insist
on applying. S111pid hatred may ruin us all, buc intelligent hatred,
against the real causes of war, instead of against scapegoats, may save
us all from the cursed continuance of the war tradition. . . .
In considering this proposal, or any other, looking coward the
gradual or speedy elimination of international, military warfare, we
should never forget chat Hitler and his followers have no desire to
eliminate such warfare. They consider ic morally healthful; a bracing
conic; an essential part of their so-called "new order;" the crest of
their "wave of the future." Hence to find ourselves fighting a second
"war co end war," is by no means absurd. le is a clumsy way; a stupid
way; a way cbac could have been avoided, if the victors of 1918 had
been less shore-sighted and less greedy; hue right now ic is the only
way left co us. Unless Hider is stopped and a totalitarian triumph
prevented, interoacion �, military war will be given a new lease on
�fe; a new rcspeaab1lity; and the prospect of a more peaceful and
nght�us world order must be postponed for generations, perhaps for
centuries. Democracy bas bungled badly enough the cask of establish·
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ing a regime of peace and justice, but it has at least tried. Totalitarian
ism has no intention of trying.
. . . . . The liberty which we will fight to save from the tyranny
of totalitarianism is not the liberty of every citizen to hunt in vain
for a job, nor to be undeservedly penniless in his old age. Nor are
we all anxious to preserve the liberty of the most aggressive and
most ruthless few to gain the exclusive ownership of vast wealth. The
liberty we will fight to preserve, or perhaps to attain, includes a real
and stabilized opportunity for almost everybody to live productively
and with a decent minimum of coercive restraint on each individual's
desire to pursue truth and happiness according to his own best judg
ment.
In viewing the monstrous confusions in the world today, it is
hard to know whether to fear the impending darkness or to welcome
the approaching dawn. Too little have we considered the unmeasured
possioilicies for human betterment that lie just below the surface of our
present hideous war. If the promise of democracy had not been so
outrageously disappointed by its unworthy supporters, the world need
not have been menaced by totalitarianism. Probably it is not yet coo
lace for the promise of democracy to be fulfilled, if we are at lase
awake co the opportunity that comes only in a desperate emergency.
Human institutions, like molten steel, can be poured into new molds
only at terrific temperatures. Today these temperatures throughout the
world are melting down our institutions in the blast furnace of total
war. Whether we like it or not, these old institutions muse quickly
be poured into new molds - worse molds, perhaps; better molds,
possibly. The totalitarians have a brand new set of molds, designed
co hold humanity in a rigid framework of servile submission, sterile
regimentation, and ruthless intolerance. Contradicting all these horrors,
the democratic opportunity is co provide different molds, suited to
produce institutions for guiding human beings coward citizen liberty,
creative individualism, and tolerant cooperativeness. . . .
But how does all this affect you and me, and how may we, each
of us, play a worthy part in the new scenes? Does the war affect
you as a kind of "black-out" of hope, and .a paralysis of purposeful
effort? In this scene your part is not co drift along with others coward
despair or frantic fu ry. It is, rather, co react vigorously against both
these, for your own sake and for the common good. If you have any
reserve power - any religious faith, any philosophic calm, any stub
born courage - use it now. Civilization is not collapsing. It is being
poured into new molds, at terrific temperatures. Democracy is not
finished. le has grown fat, and a bit soft; probably it needed the
sharp challenge of its fanatical rivals; but its services to civilization
are still indispensable.
. . . . . I urge you not to cake a defeatist or fatalistic attitude
toward your present prospects. Such an attitude would not only lessen
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your chance to set the times right; it would also destroy your oppor
tuniry to achieve a nobiliry of spirit, without which life itself is of
very doubtful value. Nor do you need to believe that the present
evil times cannot be set right. The accumulated forces of today are
supremely potent, for good no less than for evil. In a broad sense,
mankind has triumphed over Nature, and may now utilize, as never
before, her vast resources for the betterment of human life. There
remains only the difficult, but not impossible, task of preventing a
fatally destructive misuse of these powers - by war, by greed, by Stu·
pidity. The successful performance of that task is not known to be
beyond the reach of your generation - to make a beginning at least.
I exhort you, therefore, to give yourselves the benefit of a very reason
able doubt, and to attempt that task hopefully.
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THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS
By CHARLES SEYMOUR, Ph.D., Litt.D., LL.D.
President of Yale University
With Introduction by FRANKE. MORRIS, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy, Connecticut College
DR. MORRIS:
Once in awhile a man or a woman comes into a community and
makes a mark there that is indelible. Such an individual is not neces
sarily a great thinker or a brilliant mind. Creative thought, brilliance
of mind,-these may be present to a greater or lesser degree; but by
themselves they are not the reason for the deep and lasting impression
made on friends and associates. The real reason seems to be a quality
or group of qualities characterizing a person rather than a mind. There
is a certain quiet sincerity, indicating growth beyond the level of self
seeking and competitive ambition; a genuineness that comes from
years of loyalty to higher than personal aims; a generosity of interest
in ideas and in other people.
These qualities - sincerity, genuineness, generosity of interest were, for chose of us fortunate enough to know him, outstanding traits
in Dr. Henry Wells Lawrence, Professor of History and Government at
Connecticut College from 1920 to 1942. And they are the reasons
why his personal memory will live as long as we live.
Dr. Lawrence was a lovable person, but he was also the embodi
ment of an ideal, the ideal of the liberal free mind, the mind inde
pendent and courageous enough to acknowledge no master save truth.
It is chis ideal which we wish to honor in the Henry Wells Lawrence
Memorial Lectureship, having its auspicious beginning this evening.
It is the liberal ideal as we who knew him know was represented in
high degree by Henry Lawrence. Time will inexorably bring it about
that Dr. Lawrence, the person and friend, will be forgotten; but that
which he stood for, that which he served, will not be forgotten. And
I believe that his highest wish would be that we should do just what
we are doing: establishing a lectureship with the long-time purpose
of holding high the ideal he himself folfowed,-the ideal of liberalism.
It is particularly gratifying that our first lecturer in the series
should be on every count precisely suitable to this occasion. Dr.
Seymour, President of Yale University, was a friend of Dr. Lawrence
and a fellow-student. He is himself an eminent exponent of the liberal
ideal. He is a distinguished scholar in the field of history. He was
a member of the peace conference at Paris after the first world war.
He is at present a member of the Connecticut post-war planning com
mission. Among some of his more important books bearing on the
topic, of tonight's lecture are: "The Diplomatic Background of the
War," "Woodrow Wilson and the World War," "The Intimate Papers
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of Colonel House," and "American Diplomacy During the World
War."
The topic of the lecrure this evening is "The Problem of Inter
national Security: Historical Backgrounds." le is an honor and a
pleasure to present co you our first Henry Wells Lawrence Memorial
lecturer, Dr. Charles Seymour.
PRESIDENT SEYMOUR:

It is with a deep sense of privilege th�c chi_s opporrunicy comes
to me of delivering the first of the lectures m mbute co the memory
of Henry Lawrence. I could only wish that it might serve ad�quac71y
co express the gratitude which those of us feel who worked wtth him
and also played a little in student d �ys in Paris �d New H�ven
thirty-five years ago. Lawrence w as slightly my sc�or and co him I
am deeply indebted, not merely for the personal kindness chat means
so much in the first discouraging stage of graduate study but for the
inspiration of his own devotion co serious scholarship and the example
he sec of the sacrifices necessary to achieve it. I am equally mindful
of the rare geniality that informed his scholarship. His dissertation
was concerned with institutional history but he never forgot that insci
rutions are merely an expression of human relationships. The interest
he cook in the past was concerned with actual human beings worthy of per•
sonal understanding and not with the dead puppets which some historians
cause to dance suspended from arid strings. le was inevitable that, as
he wrote history in his later years, his interpretation should have been
increasingly in terms of men and women.
It was equally inevitable that he should have intensified his
earlier conviction that the p ast is important co us because of its rele
vance co the present, and chat he became constantly more interested
in the application of the lessons of history to concemporary policies,
whether in the local, the national, or the international field. The more
history he learned the more clearly he understood and brought before
his listeners the necessity of international cooperation. We used co
talk of the _relationship of the historian to contemporary events, and
the underlymg th_ou_ght of what I have co say tonight springs from
th� common_ conv1cnon
we _ held that public opinion must be provided
_
with an h1stoncal foundaoon so solid that its conclusions will resc
not_ upon emotion but upon knowledge. Indeed my chief interest is
to illustrate,. by examples from our recent history, what Lawrence once
called the high cost of popular ignorance.
I am assuming, as he used to assume, that the nation muse evolve
a cl �r policy based pr_imarily ll:pon purely American interests but
evolvmg plans for Amencan security through incemacional cooperation.
My person �l exp�rience twenty-five years ago, as well as more recent
contacts with various boards and committees has left me without il
lusion as _ �o the pitfalls of post-war planning. There is not merely
much fuultcy but even more of danger in the drafting of political blue
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prints which sec forth a system that is perfect in every respect, save
that it demands too much of human nature. Bue there is equal peril,
or greater, in refusing the prerogative given co man, as well as co
squirrels - that of looking ahead and preparing for what we may
reasonably assume lies before us. If a man cannot live wisely without
a basic philosophy, a nation cannot live safely without a studied policy.
That policy must be formulated in clear terms and its implications must
be analyzed. Above all it muse be founded upon fact and not upon
theory.
The interest of America, as a nation, in foreign affairs is very
recent; inevitably our undersranding of the factors that determine world
relationships has been superficial. For generations we could afford the
luxury of temperamental isolation from events that went on overseas.
During the nineteenth century we were freed from all serious preoccu
pation with foreign affairs, largely by reason of the dominance of the
British Fleet in the Atlantic and by a continued and reasonably stable
balance of power on the continent of Europe. Even so late as 1914
we watched the tragedy of Sarajevo and the disastrous bankruptcy of
�e European system much as we would regard scenes in a moving
picture snow.
We did not clearly understand that our vital interests were closely
menaced by the danger of German control of Europe. Our intervention
in the first world war, as we were careful to state, was not based upon
our interest; we entered the war rather upon the theory of an idealistic
crusade for the rights of free people everywhere, or as a defense
against the attack upon our doctrine of the freedom of the seas. Mo
mentarily the nation was persuaded by Wilsonian idealism. Bue there
was little appreciation of the fact that conditions of national securiry
as well as of industrial welfare imposed upon us the necessity of
participating actively in world politics and therefore of knowing some
thing about world affairs.
When Wilsonian theories evaporated in the early twenties, and
the process was rapid, there developed inevitably a sense of self
congratulation that we were spared die perils and the intrigu es char
acteristic of European diplomacy, not untinged by a consciousness of
self-righteousness that we were not as those others are; it was accom
panied by a determination that having been once bitten in the World War
we would henceforth be doubly shy. We could not even recognize thar
there was such an international organization as the League of Nations.
We were able eagerly to embrace the Kellogg Pact because it was
purely negative and because it embodied what was becoming a popular
principle of inaction: peace without responsibility. We really believed
when we passed the Neutrality Act of 1935 that by emulating the
turtle we could keel? safe and pure. If war came we would have no�
ing to do with the dirty business. Our sins were only those of orrus
sion it is true; but we forgot that in the general confession sins of
omission are rated as more important than sins of commission. "We
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have left undone those things whkh we ought co have done," comes
fusr.
Our policy during these years was determined . by _e� oti� n r�er
cbao by cbe interest of the nation. We crusted co mrumon, m which
some western senators are strong, and we called it wisd� m. Th�re
were a few instructed and intelligent men, some of chem mfluenong
our foreign relations. Bue as a whole the nae. ion was_ ignorant and our
national policy was inevitably naive. There 1s a saying chat what you
don't know won't hurt you. Lase spring in a brilliant article Professor
Carl Becker pointed out chat in cbose years between wars, "what we
didn't know burr us a lot."
le is a pleasant American custom to contrast favorably our own
innocence of international affairs with the experience of the Europeans
and co insist upon ic as a virrue. Indeed histories have been written
of the last Peace Conference around the issue of our simple honesty
contending against the wily intrigues of our European associates in the
war. We forget that our Lord, while he urges us co be harmless as
doves, also adjures us to be wise as serpents. Naivete can frequencly
do a lot of harm. And it is a fact that our ignorance of the realities
of international relations and our innocent expectations of char Peace
Conference gave rise co false hopes the crushing of which brought on
a reaction of disillusionment. We committed an initial mistake, which
should never be repeated, of underrating the difficulties of peace
making.
Peace does not come with an armistice or even with the signing
of a document called a peace treaty. Peace implies a reconciliation of
enemies. Bue in a gathering held on the morrow of a biccer four years
struggle like cbe lase war, there was little of the spirit of conciliation,
and an assembly of archangels and martyrs would have been impotent
to create it. It was hopeless co expect cbac from chat atmosphere of
belligerency could/roceed decisions chat did not cake accouoc of the
bitter suffering an losses of the victors who were able co impose the
terms �d would certainly make the defeated pay. In every peace
treaty he �e germs o� the next war which can only be eliminated by
�e followmg gener�uon. S�;er <JUOtes the German diplomatist who
mverced the old Lann motto In tune of Peace prepare for War" inco
"Si 11i1 bell11m para pacem," - if you want a war call a peace con
ference.
. . _The difficulties of the peace�ers were intensified by the respon
s1b1licy thrown upon them of bnngmg some sore of immediate order
out of world chaos. They were expected to produce a plan of perma
nent _peace satisfactory to 30 odd alli�d states, five enemy states, to say
noth1�g ?f the n�utrals, ac the same ume chat they aaed as an executive
comrmss1on settling the turbulent current affairs of the entire world.
At the moment the great war ended a dozen minor wars broke out Poles and Czechs, Roumaniaos and Serbs Austrians and Slovenes
Hungarians and Slovaks. All these wars had to be liquidated. Coai
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mines and factories and railroads had to be reestablished. Food and
fuel distributed. The war was over but no peace was yet at hand. The
same men sat in the morning as the Supreme War Council and in the
afternoon as the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.
In our simplicity we supposed that these men who were to de
termine the fate of th� w?rld were all-powerful, and as we hoped,
for good.-And the 1llus1on was fostered as you watched them in
council, those men who had led their peoples to triumph. Clemenceau,
the apostle of victory in the darkest days of 1917, presiding in his
squat black cut-away and square boots and eternally grey-gloved
hands-dry and cruel in his rapier-like wit - it took the recipient
seconds to realize he was wounded, so sharp was the blade. Wilson,
poised and reassured by the eager devotion of the smaller nationalities
seeking awards, with the proper air of a popular professor. Lloyd
George and Balfour - at opposite poles of manner - the first on the
edge of his chair, enthusiastic and mercurial - incredibly ignorant of
continental history and geography but intuitively wise in his judgment
of political issues, whether domestic or international; Balfour, with
his head on the back of the chair and several yards of leg stretched
out in front, apparently indifferent, but with a background of historical
and philosophical wisdom that made him the most intellectually distinguished man of the conference; the Italians, Orlando jovial, gen
erous and ineffective; Sonnino with his hook-nose and jutting jaw,
avid in his nationalism and generally disliked; the two Japs (we as
sumed they were always the same two), their eyes on their maps replying to questions only with a monosyllabic "Yes." As you looked
at these men you felt here is the group that democracy has entrusted
with the mandate of assuring the new world. "They have the power."
But as debates proceeded it became clear that these men were by
no means all-powerful. Had they been as wise as Nestor they were
still responsible to the people back home and the wisdom of their
decision was still controlled by the popular endorsement. It was the
paradox of chis war waged in the cause of democracy that the ve ry
triumph of democracy gave to a nationalistic public opinion a power
to determine policies that sowed the seeds of another war, to save
democracy once again. When Lloyd George preached moderation the
Northcliffe Press barked at his heels; Clemenceau, to save his premier
ship was forced to insert the guilt clause in the treaty; Orlando was
ousted when he came co Rome without Fiume; the disavowal of Wilson
by the Senate was ratified in the election of 1920.
It is not surprising that the peacemakers in view of their difficul
ties. should have produced treaties which were far from perfe<:. �nd
which evoked a storm of critical discontent. The nature of our crmasm
indicated the wealth of our ignorance. Nobody bothered to read the
treaties, but they complained just as much. As Lloyd George remarked,
"The Versailles Treaty is the most abused and the least perused of
historical documents." People complained loudly of the Balkanization
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of Central Europe by the Peace Conference when in faa the Hapsburg
Monarchy had dissolved into the successor nations three months before
the Peace Conference met. We attacked the compromises of the treaties,
without realizing that except for compromises the�e would ha �e been
no treaties at all. Bue we lacked the understandmg to eerce1ve the
larger weaknesses of the Conference,
part at least unpo� by
impatient public opinion: the over-ambmous attempt to constitute a
.
comprehensive secdemenc into
which all the problems of the world
should be fitted; the relative under-emphasis upon econo�c as com
pared with political aspeas of peace; the over-emphasis upon the
prevention of war through coeraon rather than the removal of the
causes of war; the failure to continue the organs of inter-allied coop
eration which were scrapped for new and untried institutions.

!�

Even so, the last Peace Conference did provide the basis for a
long-lasting peace, if the successors to the Conference, statesmen and
people, had possessed the wisdom and the courage co capitalize the
opportunity. The world demanded a period of security and the settle
ment offered two methods of security. The one was experimental,
finding expression in Wilson's policy of collective security in the League
of Nations. It was based upon the assumption chat if the peaceful
powers of the world were perpetually mobilized in a political sense
against any possible aggressor no single state would dare accack the
system. A second method of security was also established, not as
idealistic, but effeaive enough so long as the Powers cared to main
tain it. This type of security was based upon the strategic control of
geographical faaors, an expression of what today we should call geo
politics. Oemenceau insisted that the Rhinelands on Germany's wescern
flank be perpetually disarmed and that a strong Czechoslovak state
control the bastion of Bohemia, a solid bulwark against German
aggression in southeast Europe. While this situation lasted it was
impossible for even a rearmed Germany co take the offensive.
le is needless to rehearse here the course of events that Jed co the
failure of European security. The League has been criticized because
it lacked teeth. But the failure lay deeper - in the reluaance of the
member states aaually to carry out the principles of coercion co which
they �ad subscribed on paper, a reluaance made dear by British refusal
co reinforce -che Covena r_it by the more specific undertaking, drafted in
the Protocol, co take aaaon to restrain any nation guilty of aggression.
So much was clear long before the League failed in ics restraint of
J apan in Manchukuo, or Italy in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the cardinal
aspect of �e League, as generally understood, was its emphasis upon
the prevention of war co the neglect of _ cJ:ie pos�tive policy of promoting
the interests of the member states, by JOmt action or compromise. The
!-,eague neve � developed
the �ens_e of_ a common responsibility, which
_
1s the essenaal basis of any 1nsucuuon and without which any inter
national organization will lack reality.
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This divorce between the theory of the League, as the instrument
of the world community, and the actual face of Geneva existing as a
battle ground of national conflict and a mirror of continental anarchy,
was bound to prove fatal. Frank Simonds emphasized it in the early
thirties. "The League," he wrote, "can have no power ocher than that
which may be delegated to it by member nations. But no nation has
yet consented to any delegation of power. The United Scates refused
to join because of che nightmare of the superstate. The British Parlia
ment rejected the Protocol because of fear that it might put a foreign
mortgage upon its fleet and army. France places its right to security
and Germany its claim to revision, above all present or prospective
League authority.
"As the Covenant of Europe dissolved into quarreling coalitions
the League of Nations has degenerated into irreconciliable groups of
countries. Today statesmen of all countries go to Geneva to impose
national views. And their publics watch chem from afar, prepared to
dismiss them if they consent co any modification or surrender."
It is worth noting, however, that despite the League's failure,
already manifest in the early 30's, Europe still possessed a strategic
security which was sufficient co preserve the peace. It failed for the
same reason as collective security- the unwillingness of the powers
to assume responsibility for decisive acrion. The great test came in
1936. The League had ceased to count, but the Rhinelands were still
disarmed and the Czechs controlled their frontiers, vitally significant
in the strategic sense. Encouraged by the Japanese example and the
Italians, Hitler threw down the gage. He entered the Rhinelands in
force. The time that Oemenceau had foreseen arrived and his gloomy
prophecy was fulfilled. British and French refused to take action and
within a few weeks the Germans began to build the Siegfried Line.
The collapse of European security followed logically and rapidly. Pro
teaed upon his western flank, Hitler could now afford to embark upon
the annexation of Austria and a year later launch the attack upon
Czechoslovakia. Munich awarded him control of the Bohemian bastion.
European security had disappeared. He was free co dietate terms and
if they were at last refused, to give the signal for another World War.
In this collapse of the European system of security we Americans
carry a responsibility which, in our criticisms of the European states,
we sometimes forget. How far events might have been different if _we
had joined the League no man can safely assert. But our abstentatton
from the League was merely a symptom of our whole irresponsible
attitude toward international problems during the entire period between
the wars. We wanted peace, but we would pay no price, run no risk,
to achieve it. Because we asked nothing of the rest of the wodd we
regarded the promotion of national interest by others as a crime. �e
felt we had made our contribution co peace simply by ourselves abstam
ing from a disturbance of the peace. This was foolish. And I remem27

ber the historian Lord Accon saying: "The wages of sin are payable in
another world; the wages of foJJy are payable down here below."
The culmination of our naivete was achieved in our endorsement
of the appeasement policy of Britain and France by th: passing of the
Neutrality Aas. We thereby announced co them chat 1f they dared co
oppose Hider they would get no help from us; we announced co �e
people of the world that they could be suce chat we would stand aside
from any conflict, no matter what its implications; chat we �ould even
surrender our traditional claims ro the freedom of the seas m defense
of which we had previously fought both British and �rmans; we
also informed Hitler that so far as we were concerned he mtght proceed
oo any course he chose without fear of the conseq_uences. We faced
the awful results in 1940 when it seemed as though the lase bulwark
between us and a German-ruled Europe had fallen.
Our folly was the result of our ignorance and the time has come
when we, as a nation, must learn the facts of international affairs and
learn how co understand them. Back in 1907 Theodore Roosevelt
insisted: "We have no choice, we people of the United States, as co
whether we shall play a great part in the affairs of che world. That
has been determined for us, by face, by the march of events. We have
co play that pact. All that we can determine is whether we play it well
or ill." If we are co play ic well we muse learn the rules of the game
and the facts which shaJJ determine our accion.
Certain of chese facts emerge from the history of recent years.
Oearly circumstances not of a temporary sort, have developed, which
compel us to cooperate accively with the other peace-loving nations.
This is not a revolution. It is an evolution resulring from changing
conditions of which we rather stupidly became aware at a late dace, but
which are now and will remain compelling. Our founding fathers
sought co insulate us from the European system, but they realized more
clearly than some of their successors that the hope might not be
realized. Indeed, in the days of Napoleon and the Holy Alliance,
such Statesmen as Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and John Quincy Adams
saw protection from that system only in a close working alliance with
the British. Today and henceforth we cannot afford to disregard
Europe; our tardy realization of the danger of its control by an aggres
sive power has already cost the greatest price in blood and treasure
of our history. There can be no more Neutrality Aces. We muse par
ticipate with equal activity in the peaceful organization of the Far East.
Our policy of accive participation in world affairs depends upon
the close cooperation of the great powers: the United States, Russia
Great Britain, France, and because of her moral significance, China'.
Accually at the moment, we, the British, and the Soviet Union hold
the key �o the ge �eral security _problem. Recognizing that there are
many pomts at which our own mterests and those of the British will
con�icc, we must pr?C�ed to_ isolate these issues and eliminate every
possible cause of fnmon with them. There is no single American
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interest so important as the general interest of close collaboration with
the British Commonwealth of nations. Any break would be disastrous.
It is equally vital that in concert with the British we develop
policies chat will assure the friendship and cooperation of Soviet Russia.
We muse srudy che wellsprings of Soviet foreign policy so as co under
stand them and present our own policies in a light that will evoke
from Russia a favorable response. This does not mean that we shall
yield our independent point of view as to seeps co be taken, in the
restoration of Europe and the maintenance of her peace. It does recog
nize as a fact che indisputable strength of Russia and her immediate
interest in various European problems which for us are distant, and
important chiefly as factors liKely to affect world peace.
France and China cannot be excluded from the group of con
trolling powers. Our own interests are served by the revival of French
political strength so that it may be comparable with the cultural posi
tion she occupies among the civilized nations. The military potential
of China is doubtless questionable; her history, her size, and the
aspitations of her leaders compel her recognition.
Today wars arise, directly or indirectly, from clashes among the
great powers; che important problem is to find ways of reconciling the
great powers to peace with each other and to cooperation in furthering
the interests of all nations, small and large. Upon such cooperation
must be founded whatever international organization finally results
from the Dumbarton Oaks plan. The history of the League of Nations
indicates conclusively that the sincere and intimate cooperative efforts
of che great powers are basic to success.
There is a further conclusion to be drawn from the history of the
past twenty-five years, which is closely relevant to our roblem of
/
security. We Americans must learn to escape the untutore emotional
ism which characterized the naivete of our: attitude at the close of the
last war. We must beware, on the one hand, the excess of optimistic
idealism that suggests that if only the proper formula of international
organization can be agreed upon, a lasting peace will thereby be se
cured; we must also beware the blind cynicism of the unregenerate
nationalist who insists that safety lies only in regarding e"!ery alien
state as an inevitable enemy - each for himself and the devil take the
hindmost. Both attitudes are unrealistic. We cannot expect suddenly
to achieve perfection. The last Peace Settlement was wrecked � t�is
country because of Perfectionists on the one hand and Isolat1orusts
on the other. We cannot afford to repeat the disaster. It is worth
always remembering the words of Salvador de Madariaga:_ "Our �es
must be idealistic and our feet realistic. We must walk m the nght
direction but we must walk step by step. Our: tasks are: to define wh�c
is desirable; co define what is possible . . . . ; to carry out what 1s
possible in the spirit of what is desirable."
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